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INFECTIOUS DISEASE: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
Enhorn v. Sweden
European Court of Human Rights: [2005] E.C.H.R. 56529/00.
Introduction
While there has been considerable scrutiny by both domestic courts and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) of issues of contested
medical treatment, little judicial attention has addressed the exercise
of public health powers. Indeed, the role of law in public health has
been much neglected at both judicial and academic level. This is on
one level surprising, given the vulnerability of many statutory public
health powers to challenge on human rights grounds. It is, however,
perhaps less surprising when it is remembered that historically public
health powers have been exercised over the most impoverished sectors
of communities: the homeless, ethnic minority populations and the
poor.
In Enhorn v. Sweden the ECHR recognised that ‘the Court has only to
a very limited extent decided cases where a person has been detained for
the prevention of spreading infectious diseases’.1 Most European states
have statutory powers2 enabling a range of compulsory interventions,
from compulsory vaccination to the compulsory medical examination,
compulsory quarantine3 and compulsory isolation or detention of
infected persons. The Court took the opportunity to determine in this
case criteria for determining whether public health powers in cases of
infectious disease complied with Convention rights. Such criteria will
be of importance to the interpretation of public health powers in the
United Kingdom, given that the Public Health Act 1984 and its equiva-
lents in Northern Ireland and Scotland contain detention powers similar
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to, but with fewer protections than, the Swedish laws under examin-
ation in this case.
In the case of Enhorn v. Sweden the applicant was a homosexual man,
aged 56, infected with the HIV virus. In 1990 he had transmitted the
virus to a 19-year-old man. Subsequently, the county medical officer
issued instructions to the applicant under the Infectious Diseases Act
1988 (Sweden), requiring the applicant to comply with a list of require-
ments, such as that he inform sexual partners of his HIV status; that he
use a condom; that he limit his alcohol intake; that he inform healthcare
staff of his status when he sought medical treatment; and that he consult
his physician on a regular basis.4 The applicant failed to comply with
these requirements. The county medical officer then successfully
sought an order from the County Administrative Court that the appli-
cant be compulsorily detained in isolation for up to three months.
The applicant absconded, was arrested and detained under the Order.
He frequently absconded thereafter with the result that a series of
court orders were made against him for further periods of detention
over the following seven years. Medical evidence5 suggested that
because of a paranoid personality disorder, the applicant lacked some
awareness of the risk of disease contagion resulting from his behaviour.
The applicant complained to the ECHR that the compulsory isolation
orders and his involuntary detention in a hospital had been in breach of
Article 5(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that ‘Everyone has
the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a pro-
cedure prescribed by law’. The possible grounds for restrictions on
liberty include ‘the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of
the spreading of infectious diseases’.
There were two strands to the applicant’s argument. Firstly, he argued
that the deprivation of liberty was not in accordance with the substan-
tive and procedural requirements of domestic law. Secondly, he con-
tended that the substantive provisions of Article 5 were not made out
in his case, given that the detention did not constitute a proportionate
response to the need to prevent the spread of infectious disease.
Swedish Public Health Legislation: A Procedure Prescribed
by Law?
In order for a detention to be ‘lawful’ under Article 5 of the Convention,
it must first comply with the requirements of domestic law. In this case,
4 Supra, n. 1, para. 9.
5 Supra, n. 1, para. 19.
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the applicant argued that the procedures set out in the public health
legislation were insufficiently precise to enable compliance. Section 38
of the 1988 Act empowers a detention order to be made ‘if there is reason-
able cause to suppose that the infected person is not complying with the
practical instructions’ and that the failure to comply entails a ‘manifest
risk of the infection being spread’. The applicant pleaded that the require-
ments of ‘reasonable cause’ and ‘manifest risk’ had not been determined
and, in particular, that the county medical officer had not established that
the applicant’s behaviour amounted to a manifest risk of disease spread.
The Court held that where there was a deprivation of liberty, it is par-
ticularly important that the principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It
was therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty
under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law be foreseeable
in its application. This would entail law of sufficient detail and precision
to enable a person such as the applicant to understand and foresee the
legal consequences of non-compliance.
At the same time, however, the Court stated that it is for domestic
courts to interpret and apply domestic law. The 1998 Act gave to the
physician considerable discretion as to the content of the instructions
to patients suffering from a disease dangerous to society and power to
the county medical officer to amend these instructions as he thought
appropriate. The County Administrative Court and the Administrative
Court of Appeal had carefully examined the instructions given to the
applicant in this case and had concluded that the requirements of
the 1988 Act were fulfilled. The Court was satisfied on that basis that
the detention was in compliance with Swedish law.
The Substantive Requirements of Article 5
The Court made clear that any such detention must be in compliance
with both the principle of proportionality and the requirement that
there be an ‘absence of arbitrariness’6 such that other less severe
measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard
the individual and the public. This would entail that the deprivation of
liberty was necessary in all the circumstances.
The Court noted the paucity of case law on the detention of persons to
prevent the spread of infectious disease, and turned to case law on
detention on the basis of mental disorder7 and alcoholism8 for assist-
ance. Such cases made clear that for detention to comply with principles
of proportionality and freedom from arbitrariness, it must be estab-
lished that the detained person is suffering from an infectious disease,
6 Chahal v. U.K. [1996] E.C.H.R. 22414/93.
7 See e.g. Winterwerp v. Netherlands [1979] E.C.H.R. 6301/73.
8 See e.g. Witold v. Poland [2000] E.C.H.R. 26629/95.
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that the spread of disease is dangerous to public safety and that the
detention of the infected person is the last resort measure in order to
prevent disease spread. There must also be some relationship between
the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place
and conditions of detention. In other words, the institution of detention
for infectious disease must be appropriate to the nature of the disease.
The Court found that where these conditions are satisfied, deprivation
of liberty is justified, both on grounds of public policy and in order to
provide medical treatment. Thus, Article 5 has as its objective not
only the protection of the public but also protection of the interests of
the subject of the detention.
It was accepted that the HIV virus was sufficiently dangerous to
public safety to justify detention, but the question remained whether
detention was in the best interests of the applicant in this case. Detention
would need to be a last resort, where less severe measures had been con-
sidered and tried and had been found to be insufficient to protect public
safety. On the facts there was no evidence that less severe measures had
been considered and found inadequate. The applicant had to some
extent complied with instructions given to him previously ( for
example, informing healthcare staff of his HIV status) and his attitude
was not one of intentional or even reckless transmission of disease to
others. Despite Enhorn’s prolonged absence from hospital, he had not
infected any further sexual partners with HIV. The practical instructions
issued to the applicant appeared to be sufficiently effective to satisfy the
objective of containment of the disease. The Court found on the facts
that the compulsory isolation of the applicant was not a last resort
measure in order to prevent him from spreading disease. The continued
extension of the isolation order over a period of seven years, with almost
one and a half years detention in hospital, resulted in an unfair balance
between the need to ensure that the virus did not spread and the appli-
cant’s right to liberty. The detention therefore breached Article 5.
The Relevance of Enhorn for the United Kingdom
The Infectious Diseases Act 1988 (Sweden) has considerably broader
coverage than equivalent UK legislation, regulating both ‘diseases
dangerous to society’ and ‘other infectious diseases’. Public health
powers in case of infectious disease in England and Wales9 are provided
9 Similar powers exist in Northern Ireland (the Public Health (Ireland) Act 1878, the
Public Health (Northern Ireland) Act 1967 and the Health and Personal Social Services
and Public Health (Northern Ireland) Act 1986) and Scotland (Public Health (Scotland)
Act 1897, the Public Health (Infectious Diseases) (Scotland) Regulations 1975, the
Infectious Diseases (Notification) Act 1889 and the Public Health (Notification of Infec-
tious Disease) (Scotland) Act 1988).
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primarily by the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 together
with the Public Health (Infectious Disease) Regulations 1988.10 In
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, powers of detention apply only
to specified diseases,11 including cholera, plague, relapsing fever, small-
pox, typhus, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, acute encephalitis,
acute poliomyelitis, meningitis, anthrax, diphtheria, leprosy, rabies,
scarlet fever and tuberculosis.12 Under sections 37 and 38 of the
Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, in relation to diseases to
which these sections apply,13 a local authority may apply to a justice
of the peace for an order compulsorily to remove a person suffering
from such a disease to hospital and to detain that person in hospital.
There has for some time been concern that public health powers
under the 1984 Act are vulnerable to challenge on the grounds that
they constitute a breach of human rights.14 The provisions of the
1984 Act date back to nineteenth-century legislation and were drafted
at a time of very different medical understandings of disease contagion,
and very different social understandings of the balance between individ-
ual rights and the public good. There is no scientific evidence base for
powers and offences15 under the Act in line with the requirements of evi-
dence-based practice, making it difficult to argue that exercise of these
powers is ‘necessary’ or even effective in disease control.
As with the Swedish legislation, there is concern that detention
powers under the 1984 Act potentially breach Article 5 of the Conven-
tion. This warrants examination of the application of the two strands of
the ECHR judgement in Enhorn to equivalent powers in the United
Kingdom. In relation to the first strand of the Court’s argument, the
ECHR required in Enhorn that the general principle of legal certainty
be satisfied, such that the conditions for deprivation of liberty be
clearly defined and the domestic law be foreseeable in its application.
10 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 enables regulations to be made to provide powers in
‘emergencies’ and an emergency is defined to include events that threaten harm to
human health. No such regulations have been made at time of writing.
11 Note, however, that under Scottish legislation such powers can apply to all infectious
diseases.
12 There are no detention powers in relation to emerging diseases such as SARS and avian
flu, although there are powers under section 16 of the 1984 Act to direct that other dis-
eases be notifiable and, thus, subject to specified public health powers.
13 The Schedule to the Infectious Disease Regulations 1988 lists which powers of the 1984
Act apply to which diseases.
14 See A. Harris and R. Martin, ‘The Exercise of Public Health Powers in an Era of Human
Rights: The Particular Problem of Tuberculosis’ (2004) 118 Public Health 312.
15 For example, it is an offence under the Act if you are suffering from some notifiable dis-
eases to return books to a library or to take washing to a laundry, although contempor-
ary science does not support risk of disease contagion from such activities.
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Under section 37 of the 1984 Act, a justice of the peace, on the appli-
cation of the local authority, may make an order for compulsory removal
to hospital of a person suffering from a disease to which section 37
applies where three requirements are satisfied: that the circumstances
of the infected person are such that proper precautions cannot be
taken or are not being taken; that serious risk of infection is thereby
caused to other persons; and that accommodation is available in a suit-
able hospital. A detention order will then be made under section 38 if the
justice of the peace is satisfied that an inmate of a hospital for infectious
diseases16 who was suffering from such a disease would not on leaving
hospital be provided with lodging or accommodation in which proper
precautions could be taken to prevent the spread of disease.
As with ‘manifest risk’ in the Swedish legislation, the requirement of
‘serious risk of infection’ to other persons as required by sections 37 and
38 might be sufficiently clear, although in fact the wording of the 1984
Act has undergone little examination in the domestic courts. The
requirement of ‘lodging or accommodation in which proper precautions
could be taken to prevent the spread of disease’ is less clear. In the case
of some diseases, isolation at home would be a sufficient measure to
prevent the spread of disease, so that only in the case of a homeless
person or a person in institutional accommodation could it be said
that no appropriate accommodation was available. Indeed, it may
well be that hospitals in the United Kingdom have limited suitable
accommodation for persons with infectious disease.
The ground for detention in the Swedish legislation was non-compli-
ance with practical instructions. It has been suggested that in reality the
trigger factor for application for removal and detention orders under the
1984 Act is often the failure or refusal by the infected person to comply
with a treatment regime rather than an absence of suitable accommo-
dation.17 The CDR Weekly reports an example case where a patient
with infectious tuberculosis was detained under the Act ‘due to his infec-
tious state and refusal to take reasonable precautions to prevent trans-
mission to others’.18 Under the modification of section 38 detention
powers for persons with acquired immunity deficiency syndrome,19
16 There is now little such specialist hospital accommodation in the United Kingdom.
17 See e.g. R. Coker, ‘Tuberculosis, Non-compliance and Detention for the Public Health’
(2000) 26 Journal of Medical Ethics 157. See also K. Sepkowitz ‘How Contagious is
Tuberculosis?’ (1996) 23 Clinical Infectious Diseases 954.
18 PHLS Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, 12 CDR Weekly No. 42, 17 October
2002.
19 Section 5 Public Health (Infectious Disease) Regulations 1988 states that detention may
also take place where the justice of the peace is satisfied that on leaving hospital, proper
precautions to prevent spread of disease would not be taken by the infected person in his
lodgings or in any other place he might be expected to go.
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the behaviour of the person subject to the detention application is rel-
evant, but only in relation to precautions to be taken in lodgings and
other places, and not in relation to treatment. In relation to other dis-
eases, the behaviour of the infected person is not a ground for detention.
While refusal to comply with treatment may well increase risk of disease
contagion, public health legislation does not authorise detention on
grounds of non-compliance and such detention would not be in accord-
ance with procedures prescribed by law.
Unlike the Swedish legislation, the 1984 Act contains no time limits
on detention20 and an order may be renewed for as long as is considered
necessary. This might well be until the subject of the order ceases to be
infectious. There are no statutory or common law powers of compulsory
treatment, so that where the patient refuses treatment the detention
period could be significant. This absence of fixed time limits within
the legislation restricts the ‘foreseeability’ of the application of detention
powers and is likely to fall foul of the principle of clarity underlying
Article 5. In addition, detention powers in England and Wales can be
made ex parte, so the subject of the order may not have the opportunity
to put a case in defence. Indeed, it is questionable whether such pro-
cedures are in accordance with national law. The Court of Appeal pro-
posed in St George’s Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v. S21 that ‘Since a
declaration ought not to be made on a interim basis, or without ade-
quate investigation of the evidence put forward by either side, it
follows that a declaration (especially one affecting an individual’s per-
sonal autonomy) ought not to be made on an ex parte basis.’22
Nor does the Act provide review or appeal procedures in relation to
some scheduled diseases. If one were to follow the approach of the
ECHR and make comparisons with law governing persons of
‘unsound’ mind, then it is worth noting that the Mental Health Act
1983, for all that it has been criticised for failing to respect the
human rights of persons with mental illness, provides limits on the
initial detention of such persons and provides opportunities for review
and appeal. Article 5(4) of the Convention requires that every detained
person is entitled to take proceedings so that the lawfulness of the deten-
tion can be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the
detention is not lawful. Article 6 of the Convention provides the right
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time. While there is
always the possibility of challenging detention by means of judicial
20 Under section 38 the justice of the peace may ‘direct detention for a period specified in
the order’ and ‘any justice of the peace . . . . . . may extend a period so specified as often
as it appears to him to be necessary to do so’.
21 [1998] 3 All E.R. 673.
22 Per Judge L.J.
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review, the judicial review process may not in itself amount to an
opportunity for review for the purposes of Articles 5 and 6.23 Hence,
although on the facts of Enhorn the exercise of powers under Swedish
legislation was found not to have breached the requirement of compli-
ance with procedures prescribed by law, exercise of powers under the
1984 Act may well do so.
The second limb of the Court’s examination required that the public
health authority justify detention by establishing that less severe
measures had been considered and found insufficient in the light of
public safety. In Enhorn, earlier measures, such as the issuing of detailed
formal instructions and isolation within the community, had been
attempted before the detention orders were sought. The Court noted
that the applicant had acted in partial compliance with these measures,
such that these less intrusive measures had to some extent been effective.
Despite the fact that the applicant had absconded, the risk to others of
disease contagion had not increased. The Court emphasised that deten-
tion should only be used as a last resort, in circumstances where lesser
measures were not sufficient to reduce disease risk. On the facts of
Enhorn, the lesser measures did appear to be sufficient, removing the
need for detention.
Under the 1984 Act there are few opportunities to subject an infected
person to less severe measures. There are no preliminary stage powers,
such as powers of formal instructions, as are available under the
Swedish Act. Nor are there powers of quarantine or isolation in the com-
munity. Where a person with an infectious disease recognised by public
health legislation poses a risk of disease contagion to others, whether
because the infectious person refuses to comply with treatment opportu-
nities or because there is no suitable accommodation for that person
within the community, public health agencies have few options in the
pursuit of disease protection.
The reality is that compulsory detention in the UK of patients with
HIV/AIDS is rare. Support services for AIDS sufferers are well organ-
ised and HIV/AIDS spread is linked to identifiable risk behaviours.
Compulsory detention under the 1984 Act does, however, take place
of persons with infectious tuberculosis, which while significantly more
common in our community than HIV/AIDS, has attracted less commu-
nity support. Indeed, while there has been considerable education
against stigma in relation to HIV/AIDS, it remains the case that tuber-
culosis is seen as a disease of the poor, the homeless and immigrant com-
munities. Within the UK the implications of the decision in Enhorn will
23 R (on the application of Beeson) v .Dorset C.C. [2002] H.R.L.R. 15. This decision was
reversed in part at [2003] H.R.L.R. 11 without settling this point.
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resound particularly in the context of the compulsory detention of
persons with infectious tuberculosis.
Tuberculosis is problematic because failure to complete treatment, or
intermittent treatment, can result in the patient developing the more
serious multidrug-resistant tuberculosis,24 which is in itself contagious.
The provision of uninterrupted treatment can be difficult in relation to
vulnerable persons who may be unable or unwilling to comply with
treatment. In the case of homeless persons, for example, where there
is no adequate community placement, cessation of treatment poses
serious risk to the patient and, potentially, to the public. Such risk is dif-
ficult to quantify, but the onus rests on the public health agency to show
that compulsory detention is a measure proportionate to the risk of
spread of disease.
One obstacle to establishing proportionality is that there is a paucity of
evidence to suggest that detention is either effective or necessary as a
measure in the control of disease spread. France, which has a similar
socio-economic and geographic climate to the United Kingdom, has no
detention powers and yet has a more stable tuberculosis rate.25 There
is also evidence to suggest that the compulsory detention of persons
with disease has resulted in transmission of disease to other patients.26
The burden on a public health authority to establish that detention in a
hospital, possibly a hospital some considerable distance from the
subject’s home given the limited number of hospital isolation wards
and for an unlimited amount of time, was ‘necessary’ for the prevention
of the spread of disease, as required by the ECHR, would be significant.
Public Health Interventions and the Public/Private Balance
The containment of infectious disease is a continuing public health pri-
ority, made more urgent by the threat of newly emerging diseases such
as SARS and avian influenza. It is generally accepted that states and com-
munities have the right, if not a moral mandate, to protect its citizens
against disease harms, and that such protection may well require some
intrusion into individual rights and individual interests. Determination
24 There have been several serious outbreaks of Isoniazid tuberculosis in recent years,
including an outbreak of over 100 persons in North London: A. Davies, M. Ruddy
and F. Neely, ‘Outbreak of Isoniazid Resistant Tuberculosis in North London 1999–
2002’ Confidential Report for Incident Control Committee, December 2002.
25 S. da Lomba and R. Martin, ‘Public Health Powers in Relation to Tuberculosis in
England and France: A Comparison of Approaches’ (2004) 6 Medical Law International
117.
26 In 2002, a patient at a hospital in Kent was found to have contracted multidrug-resistant
tuberculosis from a patient compulsorily detained in the same hospital: 12 CDR Weekly
No. 42, 17 October 2002.
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of criteria for when such intrusion is appropriate is problematic, and is
contingent on the identification and perception of risk.
The Swedish Infectious Diseases Act required determination of a
‘manifest risk’ of disease spread to justify invoking detention powers.
Much of the examination in the judgement of the Court in Enhorn
focused on evidence as to the extent to which Enhorn posed a risk to
others. The Swedish government interpreted the applicant’s personality
and case history as indicating that he would continue to act in such a
way as to risk disease spread. The Court understood the evidence to
suggest that Enhorn was no longer a risk to the public. In the end the
finding that the detention order had offended against Article 5 rights
came down to the fact that the Court perceived the risk to others to
be less serious. No criteria for measurement of risk were included in
the Swedish Act. Nor is there direction as to determination of
‘serious’ risk in the equivalent English legislation.
Even where scientific calculation can be applied to the assessment of
risk, there may be difficulty in determining relative risk, acceptable or
justifiable risk27 and responsibility for bearing risk. Decisions on risk
are usually taken where the evidence is inconclusive, and where there
are political and media pressures to act promptly. In other contexts of
risk regulation, such as environmental risk, those responsible for the
protection of the public are encouraged to apply the ‘precautionary
principle’ such that where there is risk of serious or irreversible harm,
absence of full scientific certainty should not be an obstacle to taking
steps to reduce or prevent risk.28 The preamble to the English Public
Health Act 1984 states that its purpose includes ‘to control disease’.
The precautionary principle would suggest that to achieve this
purpose, public health officials should err on the side of caution. Yet
without assistance from the legislation in the assessment of risk, it is
inevitable that exercise of public health powers in cases where manifest
or serious risk cannot be scientifically proven will be struck down as
offending Article 5. There was no reference to the precautionary prin-
ciple in the judgement in Enhorn and the evidence on risk was con-
sidered on the assumption that in such cases risk to the public carries
no greater weight than risk to the liberty of the individual where
those risks are to be balanced.
If there is to be reform of public health law, attempts in other jurisdic-
tions to clarify the process of risk assessment could provide some
27 See K. Calman and G. Royston, ‘Risk Language and Dialects’ (1997) 315 British
Medical Journal 939.
28 See e.g. World Health Organization ‘Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health
Cautionary Policies’ at www.who.int/docstore/peh-emf/publications/facts_press/
EMF-Precaution.htm.
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assistance. For example, the Public Health Act 1997 in the Australian
Capital Territory sets out criteria for determination of whether
conditions are liable to become a public health risk, including regard
to the number of persons affected or potentially affected by the
conditions; the degree or potential degree of public health risk,
damage or offensiveness to community health standards; any reasonable
precautions that the person creating the risk might have or have not
taken to avoid or minimise the adverse consequences; and any reason-
able precautions that the person at risk might take or might not have
taken to avoid or minimise the effect of the risk.29 Without criteria
for risk determination, in circumstances of uncertainty the assessment
of risk is no more than guesswork. The public health body with respon-
sibility for disease control is then charged with a statutory duty that
cannot be fulfilled.
The question of the public/private balance in the context of infectious
disease needs to be addressed and consideration given to incorporation
of a precautionary approach into public health legislation. The emer-
gence of a disease such as SARS serves to bring the debate to public
attention, and at such times there is usually public and media support
for strong public health powers to contain disease. It is arguable,
however, that such a debate should not take place in the headlights of
an oncoming threat, but rather we should be deciding now the
balance we would wish to see between public benefit and private
rights. The decision in Enhorn prioritised the private right of liberty
over the public benefit of disease protection in a case of HIV/AIDS,
despite the assessment of government public health officials that there
was some risk to public health. The extent to which this decision can
serve as a precedent where the risk is of large-scale, fast-spreading
disease of unknown epidemiology is questionable.
Conclusion
Law has the potential to be a very useful tool for the attainment of
public health. Bad law, however, can serve to create obstacles to
public health. Public health consultants in England and Wales have
been cautious in using detention powers, even in cases of serious risk
of disease spread by a non-compliant patient, because of lack of
clarity of the status of these powers in relation to human rights.
Enhorn illustrates that similar concerns exist in relation to legislation
elsewhere in Europe. There have been many calls for reform of public
health legislation in the United Kingdom by academic commentators,30
29 Section 69(2)(a)–(d). For discussion on the assessment of risk in Australian legislation,
see C. Reynolds, Public Health: Law and Regulation (Federation Press 2004).
30 See e.g. A. Harris and R. Martin, supra, n. 14, and R. Coker, supra, n. 17.
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public health consultants31 and in government documents.32 Public
health law has undergone a process of reform in other jurisdictions
that had adopted their public health laws from English law,33 following
the SARS scare in 2003.34 Any doubt as to the implications of
the Human Rights Act 1998 for the Public Health Act 1984 must
now have been settled by the decision in Enhorn. Once again we can
only call upon the government to make reform of public health an
issue of the highest priority and not to wait for the threat of a new or
re-emerging disease in order to pass with haste emergency legislation.
Robyn Martin
Centre for Research in Primary and Community Care
University of Hertfordshire
doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwi038
31 In the Mail on Sunday, 15 May 2005, Dr Philip Monk, a communicable disease special-
ist in Leicestershire, commenting on a case in which 12 people were thought to have con-
tracted tuberculosis from a person with infectious tuberculosis who had refused
treatment, said, ‘We cannot adequately protect people from infectious disea-
ses . . . . . . This case illustrates the failures of the current public health laws to perfection.
There is an urgent need to review them.’ He made similar comments in the New Scien-
tist, 14 May 2005.
32 The Acheson Report, Public Health in England: The Report of the Committee of
Inquiry into the Future Development of the Public Health Function (HMSO 1988);
The Department of Health, Review of Law on Infectious Disease Control: Consultation
Document (1989); Chief Medical Officer, On the State of the Public Health: The
Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer for the Year 1997 (Department of Health
1998); Chief Medical Officer, Getting Ahead of the Curve: A Strategy for Combating
Infectious Diseases (Department of Health 2002).
33 Such as New Zealand and Australia.
34 Note that after considerable debate, SARS was not made a notifiable disease under UK
legislation, in part because without any quarantine powers, there was little point in
bringing SARS under the provisions of the Act.
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